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Blythe v. Seagraves: North Carolina Treats the Issue of Whether a Minor
and Her Parents May Legally Consent to the Minor's Participation,
as Donor, in a Kidney Transplant
North Carolina initially treated the issue of whether a minor and her
parents may legally consent to the minor's participation, as the donor,
in a kidney transplant, in Blythe v. Seagraves.' In Blythe, the court
granted a declaratory judgment authorizing the defendant parents and
minor donor to consent to the minor's participation in the transplant
operation.
In Blythe, the factual situation is somewhat unique. Sandy Marleen
Seagraves, a 15 year old girl, was suffering from chronic renal failure.
There was no hope of normal renal function without a kidney trans-
plant. Sandy's identical twin sister, Cindy Louise, was the most suita-
ble donor.2 Cindy and her parents desired to consent to the operation.
However, the surgeons and attending physician required a judicial dec-
laration that there existed legally effective consent3 before proceeding
with the operation. Consequently, this suit was brought by the physi-
cians and the University of North Carolina, as parties plaintiff, for a
declaratory judgment, naming the prospective donor and her parents as
parties defendant.4 By virtue of its equity jurisdiction, the court gave
judicial authorization to the defendants to consent to the surgery. The
court concluded that the need for the transplant was urgent; the
probability of a successful transplant was highly favorable; this proce-
dure was preferable to all the other alternatives; the duty of the court to
authorize the operation was clear; the transplant would be beneficial to
the donor; the psychological benefit to the donor greatly outweighed
the slight hazards to her from the procedure; and the donor was capa-
ble of giving, and had given, an informed consent.5
A surgical operation is a technical battery unless there has been ex-
press or implied consent by the patient.6 The common law and major-
1. Blythe v. Seagraves, Civil No. 75-4980 (Guilford County Super. Ct., N.C., Jul. 18, 1975).
2. A one-egg twin graft from one to the other, as was the case in Blyihe, is not presented
with the problem of rejection, since a one-egg twin carries the same genetic material. Hart v.
Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 372, 289 A.2d 386, 388 (1972). (This paper will necessarily deal only
with cases of minor and incompetent donors; however, this fact would obviously increase the
potential benefit to the donee.)
3. Consent constituting a complete defense to a battery action. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Blythe v. Seagraves, Civil No. 75-4980 (Guilford County Super. Ct., N.C., July 18, 1975).
5. Id. at 2-5 (mimeographed opinion).
6. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122
1
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ity rule is that minors are not legally capable of consenting to a surgical
operation.7 There is, however, some authority to the effect that,
whether a minor is legally capable of consenting to a medical proce-
dure depends on his ability to understand the contemplated procedure.
8
While the common law and majority rules have been that parents may
consent to medical procedures on their minor children, it was presup-
posed that the contemplated medical procedure would necessarily be
potentially beneficial to the minor.9 There is, of course, no potential
physiological benefit to the donor of a kidney. Therefore, courts
presented with the question of whether or not to grant legal authority to
parents or the minor, to consent to the minor's donating a kidney, have
had to reevaluate what is in the best interests of the minor donor.'0
Thus, different tests and doctrines have been developed and applied.
Due to the relatively recent advent of this particular branch of
medico-legal jurisprudence, there has been a paucity of cases dealing
with the subject." Curran 2 found and discussed three unreported
Massachusetts cases significant enough to be worthy of mention here.
The first, and probably most significant case was Masden v. Harrison.
l3
In Masden, Leon Masden, 19 years old, was suffering from chronic glo-
merulonephritis, with the only hope for life being the transplant of one
of twin-brother Leonard's kidneys. Both Leonard and his parents tes-
tified at the hearing. Leonard affirmed that he had been fully in-
formed of the operation and gave full consent thereto. A psychiatrist
who had interviewed the twins testified that, if the operation was not
performed and the sick twin died, it would result in "grave emotional
impact" on Leonard.' 4 The court, finding that the transplant was nec-
(D.C. Cir. 1941). See Note, Medical Jurisprudence-Parental Consent to an Operation-Parents
May Authorize a Kidney Transplant from One Child to Her Identical Twin, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
244 (1959).
7. 126 F.2d at 122; accord, Farber v. Olkon, 246 P.2d 710 (Cal. App. 1952); Anonymous v.
State, 17 App. Div. 2d 495, 236 N.Y.S. 2d 88 (1963); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108
(1967); see also Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigation, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 359
(1967).
8. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59 (1934); Skegg, Consent to Medical Procedures on Minors,
36 MODERN L. REV. 370, 373 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Skegg]. However, RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS (1965) abandoned this approach due to widespread disapproval of the courts. See
also Savage, Organ Transplantation with an Incompetent Donor. Kentucky Resolves the Dilemma of
Strunk v. Strunk, 58 Ky. L.J. 129, n.57 at 134 (1970).
9. Curran, A Problem ofConsent. Kidney Transplanatation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 891,
892 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Curran]; Skegg, supra note 8, at 375-77.
10. For an excellent discussion on the rights of minor donors in Massachusetts and generally,
see Baron, Botsford, and Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants From Minor Donors in
Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Baron, Botsford and Cole].
11. Id. at 162, n.16; Curran, supra note 9, at 892.
12. Curran, supra note 9, at 892-98.
13. No. 68651 (Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957); cited in Curran, supra note 9, at 892,
n.4.
14. Curran, supra note 9, at 893.
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essary for Leon's survival; that Leonard had been fully informed, un-
derstood the nature of the operation and possible consequences, and
had consented to it; held that the hospital and surgeon could perform
the operation, upon the consent of the parents and both twins, without
incurring either civil or criminal liability. 5 The judge, noting the testi-
mony in reference to the "clear therapeutic value" to the well twin,
applied the "best interest of the minor" test:
I am satisfied from the testimony of the psychiatrist that grave emo-
tional impact may be visited upon Leonard if the defendants refuse to
perform this operation and Leon should die, as apparently he will
... . Such emotional disturbance could well affect the health and
physical well-being of Leonard for the remainder of his life. I there-
fore find that this operation is necessary for the continued good health
and future well-being of Leonard and that in performing the operation
the defendants are conferring a benefit upon Leonard as well as upon
Leon. 16
The two other Massachusetts decisions came shortly after Masden,
and both involved 14 year old twins.' 7 All three of these cases relied
heavily on psychiatric opinion to treat the question of whether or not
there was a benefit to the donor, and found this to be the case. All
three holdings were, in substance, that the operation was necessary, and
that the twins and their parents had consented to it.' 8
In Strunk v. Strunk, 9 the court relied on the Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment to establish its chancery power to grant the parent the legal
authority to consent to the kidney transplant. 0 The use of substituted
judgment was necessary because the prospective donor, Jerry, 27 years
old, was mentally incompetent, although he had the emotions and reac-
tions of a normal person.2' His emotional attachment to his 28 year
old brother, Tom, made his treatment and eventual rehabilitation ex-
tremely dependent on Tom's survival. Further, the court found it sig-
nificant that, after the death of their parents, then in their fifties, Tom
would be Jerry's closest surviving relative.22 Without a kidney from
Jerry, Tom was not likely to survive. Furthermore, the court cited
convincing evidence of the growing acceptance of renal transplants,
and the minimal degree of risk to the donor.23  Asserting its chancery
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3 (mimeographed opinion).
17. Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harri-
son, No. 68666 (Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); both cited in Curran, supra note 9, at 893
nn.8 & 9.
18. Curran, supra note 9, at 893.
19. 445 S.W.2d 145, 35 A.L.R.3d 683 (Ky. 1969).
20. Id. at 148, 35 A.L.R.3d at 687.
21. Id. at 146, 35 A.L.R.3d at 685-86.
22. Id. at 147, 35 A.L.R.3d at 686.
23. Id. at 148-49, 35 A.L.R.3d at 688-89.
3
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power, the court also noted the early recognition of the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment:
The "doctrine of substituted judgment," which apparently found its
first expression in the leading English case of Ex parte I*ftebread
(1816 2 Meriv. 99, 35 Eng. Reprint 878 (Ch), supra 3(a), was amplified
in Re Eal of Carysfort (1840) Craig & Ph 76, 41 Eng. Reprint 418,
where the principle was first made to apply to one who was not next of
kin of the lunatic. . . . The Lord Chancellor permitted the allowance
of an annuity out of income of the estate of the lunatic earl as a retiring
pension to the latter's aged personal servant,. . . , the court being "sat-
isfied that the Earl of Carysfort would have approved if he had been
capable of acting himself." Annot., 24 A.L.R. 3d 863 (1969).24
Thus, it appears that the Kentucky court combined the "best interests
of the incompetent" test, with the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, to
grant the authority to consent to the parent.25
The Louisiana case of In re Richardson,26 involved a 17 year old
incompetent prospective kidney donor, with a mental age of 3 or 4
years, and his 32 year old sister, the prospective donee. The prospec-
tive donor was a mongoloid, with a life expectancy of 25 years. The
prospective donee had a complicated and highly problematical medical
condition, which rendered a successful transplant speculative at best.27
While restricting its ruling to the facts of the particular case, the court
relied on a strict "protection and promotion of the ultimate best interest
of the minor" test in disallowing the parents' consent for the minor.28
It analogized the protection of a minor's property with the protection of
his body:
Since our law affords this unqualified protection against intrusion in
a comparatively mere property right, it is inconceivable to us that it
affords less protection to a minor's right to be free in his person from
bodily intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in
the best interest of the minor.29
The court distinguished the Strunk ruling on the facts, particularly with
reference to the eventuality of the prospective donee caring for the mi-
nor after the death of the parents. Furthermore, the Louisiana court
24. Id. at 148, 35 A.L.R.3d at 687-88.
25. There was a three judge dissent in Sirunk which reasoned that not only did the commit-
tee lack the jurisdictional power to control the matters of the incompetent, to the extent found
possible by the majority, but also, that the action taken by the committee was not equal to the
necessary "significant benefit to the incompetent" standard to justify the use of the doctrine. 445
S.W.2d at 149-51, 35 A.L.R.3d at 689-91.
26. 284 So.2d 185 (La. App. 1973).
27. Id. at 186.
28. Id. at 187.
29. Id. A concurring opinion by Judge Gulotta suggested that three requirements be met
before the court may even consider the best interests of the minor: (I) that the surgical intrusion is
urgent, (2) that there are no reasonable alternatives, and (3) that the contingencies are minimal.
Id. at 188.
219
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found that the procedural and substantive aspects of the Strunk ruling
were not in accord with Louisiana law.3°In In re Guardianshop of
Pescinski,3  the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial court
lacked the power to order the transplant of a kidney from an incompe-
tent donor to his sister, notwithstanding the showing of her dire need
therefor.32 The prospective donor, Richard Pescinski, was a 39 year
old mental patient; diagnosed as a chronic, catatonic, schizophrenic,
with an estimated mental age of 12 years. The prospective donee, his
38 year old sister, Elaine, was suffering from chronic glomerulonephri-
tis. Her life was being sustained by the use of a dialysis machine,
which functioned as a substitute, for her two, diseased surgically re-
moved kidneys. Tests confirmed that Richard was a suitable donor.
All other family members were ruled out, as donors, due to medical
and personal reasons.33 Richard, of course, was incapable of con-
senting to the procedure. When the guardian ad/item refused to con-
sent for Richard, since no benefit was established, the county court held
itself without the power to give consent for the transplant.34
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling and
said, the guardian must act loyally in the best interests of his ward.35
There was neither any evidence that the contemplated procedure would
serve any interests of the ward, nor that Richard had consented thereto,
the court noted.36  Furthermore, there was no statutory authority to
sanction the operation.37 The court declined to adopt the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, as followed by the Kentucky court in Strunk.3 s
Following the dissent in Strunk , 39 the court said that "substituted judg-
ment" meant that equity will speak for one who cannot speak for him-
self.' The court also noted that, historically, the doctrine had been
used to permit gifts of an incompetent's property.4 However, the
court refused to extend the doctrine to the donation of one of an incom-
petent's organs:
An incompetent particularly should have his own interests protected.
Certainly no advantage should be taken of him. In the absence of real
consent on his part, and in the situation where no benefit to him has
been established, we fail to find any authority for the county court, or
30. Id.
31. 67 Wis.2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
32. Id. at 5-6, 226 N.W.2d at 180-81.
33. Id. at 5-7, 226 N.W.2d at 180-81.
34. Id. at 6; 226 N.W.2d at 180-81.
35. Id. at 7; 226 N.W.2d at 181.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 7-8; 226 N.W.2d at 181.
39. See note 25 supra.
40. 67 Wis.2d 4, 7-8; 226 N.W.2d 180, 181-82.
41. Id. at 8; 226 N.W.2d at 182.
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this court, to approve this operation.42
One dissent, in agreeing with the majority position in Strunk, found a
benefit to Richard, based on his predictably happy response, should he
regain sanity, to the fact that his transplanted kidney had saved his
sister's life.43 The dissenting opinion also enunciated definite stand-
ards to be met before the court should authorize the transplant."
In the unreported Illinois case of Children's Memorial Hospital v.
Lewis,45 the facts were strikingly similar to those in Blythe. The pro-
spective donor was a 15 year old girl, Mattie Belle Lewis. The pro-
spective donee was her one-egg twin sister, Annie Belle. Annie Belle
had been suffering from one-end kidney disease and had been kept
alive by weekly dialysis treatment, with no potential for resumption of
normal kidney function.' The only reasonable hope for her survival,
was to have Mattie Belle donate a kidney for transplantation to Annie
Belle.47 When the hospital and physicians refused to perform the
transplant without court approval for the twins' mother to consent, suit
was brought by the hospital and physicians, as parties plaintiff, for a
declaratory judgment, naming the prospective donor, donee and their
mother as parties defendant.48
The court found that Mattie Belle, Annie Belle and their mother, all
had consented to the kidney transplant.49 The court further found that
all of the defendants and the guardians ad litem, for Mattie Belle and
Annie Belle, had been fully informed of the risks and possible conse-
quences and understood the nature of the operation. ° In granting its
approval of the operation, the court concluded that the need for the
transplant was urgent; the probability of a successful transplant was
high; the procedure was preferable to the other alternatives; the trans-
plant would be beneficial to the donor; the psychological benefit to the
donor outweighed the risks and potential disadvantages to her from the
procedure; the donor was capable of giving, and had given, an in-
formed consent; the mother had lawful authority to consent to the
transplant; the guardians ad litem had carefully considered the facts
and circumstances in the case, and had consented to the transplant; and
it had full and complete jurisdiction over all parties and subject mat-
42. Id. at 8-9; 226 N.W.2d at 182.
43. Id. at 9-10; 226 N.W.2d at 182.
44. Id. at 10-12; 226 N.W.2d at 183-84.
45. Children's Memorial Hospital v. Lewis, Civil No. 73 CH 6936 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill.,
Nov. 21, 1973).
46. Id. at 2 (mimeographed opinion).
47. Id.; see note 2 supra.
48. Children's Memorial Hospital v. Lewis, Civil No. 73 CH 6936 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill.,
Nov. 21, 1973).
49. Id. at 3 (mimeographed opinion).
50. Id.
6
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ter.
5
'
Hart v. Brown52 involved a factual situation very similar to the one in
Elythe. Katheleen and Margaret Hart were 7 year old identical twins.
Initial and subsequent diagnosis revealed that Katheleen was suffering
from a potentially fatal renal disorder. A kidney transplant from her
identical twin, rather than bi-weekly dialysis therapy, appeared to be
critical to Katheleen's chances for survival, particularly in light of her
young age. When the physicians refused to operate without a judicial
declaration of the parents' legal authority to consent, suit was brought
by the parents for a declaratory judgment, naming the physicians as
defendants.53
The court established its power to exercise its equity jurisdiction, as
in Strunk, by the "Doctrine of Substituted Judgment." 4  The court
first indicated that the "[n]eed must be urgent, the probabilities of suc-
cess should be most favorable, and the duty must be clear. . . ." In
addition to citing Exparte Whitebread,56 the court reviewed the accept-
ance and expansion of the doctrine in American courts since 1844.17
In concluding that the parents should be granted the authority to con-
sent to the transplant for both minors, the court employed a combina-
tion of the legal doctrines enunciated in the Strunk case, the Bonner5"
case and the Massachusetts cases.59
Expert medical testimony established an urgent need for the opera-
tion and a high liklihood of success. The evidence indicated almost a
one hundred percent certainty that the twins would live out an emo-
tionally and physically normal life span, if Margaret was allowed to be
the donor.' On the other hand, a much lower probability of success,
and a wide range of side effects (from the administering of immunosup-
pressive drugs) were indicated if one of the parents acted as donor.6
Further evidence was introduced to establish the fact of a minimal risk
to the prospective donor. The surgical procedure was shown to carry
no greater risk than that associated with the anesthesia. It was shown
that life insurance actuaries rate kidney donors no higher than persons
with both kidneys. The worst risk to the donor would be trauma to the
51. Id. at 2-4 (mimeographed opinion).
52. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
53. Id. at 368-72, 289 A.2d at 386-88.
54. Id. at 369-71, 289 A.2d at 387-88.
55. Id. at 369, 289 A.2d at 387.
56. Id. at 370; see 245 S.W.2d at 148-49, 35 A.L.R.3d at 688-89.
57. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 369-70, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (1972).
58. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See also note 67 infra.
59. 29 Conn. Supp. at 377, 289 A.2d at 391.
60. Id. at 371-73, 289 A.2d at 388.
61. Id. at 373, 289 A.2d at 388-89.
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remaining kidney, which was shown to be only a remote possibility.62
As in the Massachusetts cases, 63 there was psychiatric testimony that
the prospective donor strongly identified with her sister and would be
greatly benefitted by a successful operation, although this carried less
weight here, due to the prospective donor's young age.64
With the urgency of the need, and the high probability of success
established, the court perceived its duty was clear and allowed the par-
ents to consent for the minor.65  The court cited Bonner v. Moran66 as
authority for the rule that parents may consent to non-therapeutic op-
erations on their minor children. However, a reading of Bonner shows
that the court there did not deal squarely with the question of when the
parent may consent for the minor.67 The court in Hart pointed out
that, whereas in Bonner the contemplated medical procedure was "rela-
tively novel," in Hart they were dealing with a generally accepted,
proven "perfect" operation. 8
The Hart court analogized that in Strunk there was an incompetent
adult with a mental age of six, while in Hart there was a minor, age
eight. While both prospective donors would potentially benefit by a
successful transplant, there was a greater probability of success in the
Hart case, since it involved identical twins.69  The court also noted the
similarity to the Massachusetts cases, in that they all involved identical
twins.70
Thus, the court in the Hart case reasoned that a ruling in favor of
granting the legal authority to the parents to consent to the transplant
could and would be determined on the basis of a combination of the
legal doctrines enunciated in the Bonner case, the Strunk case, and the
Massachusetts cases.7'
It seems likely that Blythe v. Seagraves72 will have a substantial per-
suasive effect on North Carolina courts faced with the same or similar
questions in the future. This appears likely since Blythe was the initial
62. Id. at 373-75, 289 A.2d at 389.
63. See notes 14 & 18 supra.
64. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 374-75, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (1972).
65. Id. at 375-76, 289 A.2d at 390.
66. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
67. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the minor had consented to act as
donor in a skin graft operation, with his severely burned cousin. In a battery action against the
physician, the court held that the consent of the parent was necessary for the physician to operate
on the minor. Since the court undoubtedly would have allowed the parents to consent, had the
operation been for the minor's benefit, it seems that the court in Hart inferred that this implied the
parents could consent, even if the procedure was nonbeneficial to the minor.
68. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 376-77, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (1972).
69. Id.; see note 2 supra.
70. 29 Conn. Supp. at 377, 289 A.2d at 390-91.
71. Id.
72. Blythe v. Seagraves, Civil No. 75-4980 (Guilford County Super. Ct., N.C., July 18, 1975).
8
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North Carolina judicial encounter with this growing medico-legal is-
sue. Furthermore, it was a broad decision which impliedly, if not ex-
pressly, accepted the doctrines and tests of nearly all the cases discussed
in this note.
In substance, Blythe has enunciated a multi-pronged test, as in Chil-
dren's Memorial Hospital and Hart. The court must determine: (1)
whether the need is urgent; (2) whether the probability of a successful
transplant is highly favorable; (3) whether this procedure is preferable
to all the other alternatives; (4) whether there is any foreseeable benefit
to the donor; (5) whether the minor donor is capable of giving an in-
formed consent; and (6) whether the duty of the court is clear.73
Blythe is analogous to the Massachusetts cases, Children's Memorial
Hospital and Hart, in that they all involved identical twins. However,
as to the issue of benefit to the donor, there was highly persuasive psy-
chiatric testimony in the Massachusetts cases;7 4 weak psychiatric testi-
mony in the Hart case (due to the donor's young age);75 and, finally,
the objective finding of the judge, rather than any psychiatric testi-
mony, in Children's Memorial Hospital6 and Blythe.7 7  By finding a
benefit to the donor through that observation,78 the court in Blythe has
impliedly accepted and applied the "best interests of the minor" or
"benefit" test, enunciated in the Massachusetts cases.7 9 Ironically, the
court in Blythe seems to have concomitantly accepted and applied the
balancing test adopted in the Hart case.8 ° This is ironic, because the
court in Hart apparently used the balancing test to overcome the weak
force of the psychiatric testimony, as to the benefit to the donor, so as to
enable itself to grant the parents the requisite authority to consent. In
effect, the court in Blythe provides an avenue for granting the authority
to consent to the parents, in either of these situations.
In finding that the prospective donor was an "[ilntefligent, bright,
alert and healthy-appearing young lady with a deep love for her sister
73. Id. at 2-5 (mimeographed opinion).
74. See notes 14 & 16 supra. This practice has been criticized as creating contrived testi-
mony to fit the requested relief. See, e.g., Equity--Tr Isplants-Power 0/Court to Authorize Re-
moval of Kidney from Mfental Incompetentfor Transplantation into Brother, 16 WAYNE L. REV.
1460, 1464-65 (1970); Spare Parts from Incompetents A Problem of Consent, 9 J. FAM. L. 309, 315
(1969).
75. See note 43 supra.
76. Children's Memorial Hospital v. Lewis, Civil No. 73 CH 6936 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill.,
Nov. 21, 1973), at 3-4 (mimeographed opinion).
77. Blythe v. Seagraves, Civil No. 75-4980 (Guilford County Super. Ct., N.C., July 18, 1975),
at 4 (mimeographed opinion).
78. Id.
79. See note 16 supra; Actually all of the courts have applied some form of the "best interests
of the minor" or "incompetent" test, although only the Louisiana and Wisconsin courts found no
benefit to the prospective incompetent donors.
80. 29 Conn. Sup. 368, 375-78, 289 A.2d 386, 390-91 (1972).
9
Herman: Blythe v. Seagraves: North Carolina Treats the Issue of Whether a
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1978
CONSENT TO KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
and that she expresses a deep desire to proceed with this operation," 8'
the court in Blythe, not only adopted another aspect of the test of the
Massachusetts cases82 and Children's Memorial Hospital,83 but, it also
would appear to have incorporated the common-law view as to a mi-
nor's capacity to consent, as interpreted by at least one commentator,8 4
at least some courts,85 and the Restatement of Torts.86
Although the Blythe court did not directly apply the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment as in Strunk,87 there is a sound basis for consid-
ering its more direct, extensive use, in future North Carolina cases in-
volving the same and related issues. This common-law doctrine is
solidly grounded in precedent in America. 8 By its use, the courts
could consider only the relevant psychological testimony in the appli-
cation of a more objective test.89  The test under the doctrine would
permit an objective inquiry by an impartial judge or tribunal into the
facts and circumstances which a fully competent person would make.9°
The doctrine would most logically apply to incompetents and young
minors, totally incapable of forming an adequate judgment. As to
older minors approaching the age of consent, the court could reason-
ably consider the testimony of the prospective minor donor. If, after
hearing the testimony, the court does not find the minor capable of an
informed consent, then the court could still consider the testimony as to
the weight of the objective evidence, ie. with respect to what this par-
ticular minor would have decided, in the light of all the relevant facts
and circumstances, had he been fully capable of understanding the na-
ture of the proposed medical procedure. This alternative seems more
desirable when one considers the degree to which some of the courts
seem to have strained with the "best interests of the minor test," in the
absence of any clear indication of concrete benefit to the minor donor.
81. Blythe v. Seagraves, Civil No. 75-4980 (Guilford County Super. Ct., N.C., July 18, 1975),
at 4 (mimeographed opinion).
82. See Curran, supra note 9, at 893. The test here is whether the minor can understand the
contemplated operation. It could be inferred that the Wisconsin court has impliedly adopted this
test and applied it to the incompetent in Pescinski The inference could be drawn, by the court's
finding, that the incompetent had not consented, rather than that he as incapable of doing so.
83. Children's Memorial Hospital v. Lewis, Civil No. 73 CH 6936 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill.,
November 21, 1973), at 3 (mimeographed opinion).
84. Skegg, supra note 8, at 373.
85. Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926); Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 155
Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1929); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956). See Curran,
supra note 9, at 896.
86. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59 (1934); but see note 8 supra.
87. See 445 S.W.2d at 146, 148, 149-51, 35 A.L.R.3d at 685-86, 687, 689-91.
88. 29 Conn. Supp. at 369-70, 289 A.2d at 387.
89. See note 74 supra.
90. 445 S.W.2d at 148, 35 A.L.R.3d at 687-88. Factors to be considered would be relation-
ship to donee, health of donor and donee, ages of donor and donee, etc.
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The court in Blythe fully recognized, accepted, and exercised its duty
as a chancery court. In light of the cases decided in other jurisdictions,
and the equitable demands on the court, it is submitted that the deci-
sion in Blythe was an entirely equitable one. Nevertheless, the deci-
sion-making process, as well as the future North Carolina law on this
subject, would be greatly facilitated by the direct use of the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment. The use of the doctrine will help to simplify the
sometimes complicated task of determining benefit to the donor.
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